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In the article are presented views of Anton Korošec on the “Croatian 
Question” in the interwar Yugoslavia. Despite relatively tense relations 
with most Croatian politicians, Korošec knew that certain concessions had 
to be made to the Croats in terms of the state administration reform. Yet, 
he made his support conditional on the simultaneous ful lment of Slovene 
political demands.  e paper is based mostly on the analysis of the press and 
publications of the Slovene People’s Party.




Anton Korošec, a long standing leader of the Slovene People’s Party, was 
undoubtedly one of the founding fathers of Yugoslavia.1 As the chairman of 
a group of deputies composing the Yugoslav Club in the Vienna Parliament 
and the president of the National Council of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs (the 
SHS-National Council) in Zagreb, he played a pivotal role in the decisions 
South Slav politicians made during the disintegration of the Habsburg 
Monarchy and the formation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes 
1 The article was written in the framework of the programme group P6–1038(A), titled “The past of North 
Eastern Slovenia between the Central Europe and the European Southeast”.
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(the SHS-Kingdom). 2 Korošec and the generation of politicians who assumed 
responsibility for the de nitive break from the Habsburg past in 1918, saw 
Yugoslavia as the best possible solution for the preservation of the Slovene 
nation and its further development. 
Korošec changed his attitude towards Yugoslav integralism a number 
of times. He clearly supported it when the Yugoslav state was formed in 1918, 
and in 1929, when the dictatorial rule of King Alexander was established. In 
the 1920s, however, he put himself at the helm of Slovene autonomists and 
resumed this stance at the beginning of 1930s, when he assessed that the royal 
dictatorship had failed to achieve its goal. Serving as Minister of the Interior 
in the government of Milan Stojadinović between 1935 and 1938, Korošec 
resorted once again to the time-tested formula of promulgating “national and 
state unity”, in which the Slovenes formally were merely one of the “three 
tribes of a single nation”. On the hundredth anniversary of the creation of 
Yugoslavia, it thus seems pertinent to cast more light on Korošec’s views about 
the main political challenges of his times. One of them was undoubtedly the 
“Croatian Question”.3 Until his death, Korošec was unable to shake o  the 
accusations of committing “treason” against the Croats, which became very 
much vivid in the Croatian historical consciousness after the assassination of 
Stjepan Radić and Korošec’s appointment as the Yugoslav Prime Minister. 
 erefore, the following contribution deals especially with Korošec’s attitude 
towards the “Croatian Question” in interwar Yugoslavia. 
Towards the new state
Anton Korošec entered the  nal phase of the disintegration of the 
Habsburg Monarchy as the president of the united club of all Southern 
Slav deputies in the Vienna Parliament. In their name, he read on 30 May 
1917 the famous May Declaration expressing the demand that, on the basis 
of national principles and Croatian state law, all territories inhabited by the 
2 Although the designation “founding father” is informal one and still lacks a precise historiographical 
deﬁ nition, there is no doubt that Korošec earned it as the president of the Yugoslav Club and the National 
Council in Zagreb, as well as for all his merits in the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. 
There is not enough room to provide a detailed argument here. However, based on the decisive inﬂ uence 
of their work on the establishment and the initial years of royal Yugoslavia, apart from Korošec, one could 
name the following six statesmen: Regent Alexander Karađorđević; the long-standing Prime Minister of 
Serbia and Yugoslavia Nikola Pašić; the ﬁ rst President of the Ministerial Council of the SHS-Kingdom Stojan 
Protić; the Vice-President of the National Council in Zagreb and the ﬁ rst Interior Minister of Yugoslavia 
Svetozar Pribićević; the President of the Yugoslav Committee and the ﬁ rst Foreign Minister of Yugoslavia 
Ante Trumbić; as well as the leader of the Yugoslav Muslim Organization Mehmed Spaho.
3 The following article is based mainly on the Slovene historical sources and literature. For a more detailed evaluation 
of the “Croatian Question” in the interwar Yugoslavia compare Ivo BANAC, Nacionalno pitanje u Jugoslaviji. Porijeklo, 
povijest, politika, Zagreb: Globus, 1988; Hrvoje MATKOVIĆ, Povijest Jugoslavije (1918–1991). Hrvatski pogled, 
Zagreb: Naklada Pavičić, 1998, 191–214; Dejan DJOKIĆ, Elusive Compromise. A History of Interwar Yugoslavia, 
London: Hurst and Company, 2007; Sabrina RAMET, Die drei Jugoslawien. Eine Geschichte der Staatsbildungen und 
ihrer Probleme, München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2011, 94–109, 148–158; Dragan BAKIĆ, “Milan Stojadinović, the 
Croat Question and the International Position of Yugoslavia, 1935–1938”, Acta Histriae 1/2018, 207–228.
Slovenes, Croats and Serbs should be united into an independent state unit 
under the Habsburg crown.4  e May Declaration corresponded in many ways 
with the pre-War “trialistic” plans of the Slovene and Croatian politicians.  e 
important di erence, however, was that the pre-War programmes provided 
for a long-term answer, while the May Declaration postulated an immediate 
solution.5 
 e declaration movement rapidly spread throughout the southern Slav 
provinces of the Habsburg Monarchy and gained support by some of the most 
in uential Slovene and Croatian politicians.6 By late summer 1917, Korošec and 
his political allies declared the May Declaration as the “minimum” and began 
emphasising the principle of self-determination of nations. At the beginning of 
October 1918, the southern Slav politicians established the National Council 
of the Slovenes, Croats and Serbs and appointed none other than Korošec as 
its President.  e Imperial Manifesto of 16 October came too late and o ered 
too little. Emperor Karl of Habsburg solemnly declared that Austria should, 
“in respect of the will of its nations”, become “a federal state” in which each 
nation would constitute its own “national community” in its own “area of 
settlement”.  at was most certainly a step towards the federalisation of the 
Monarchy on the basis of a national principle. Nevertheless, the Imperial 
Manifesto had at least one major  aw, the most obvious being the stipulation 
that “the integrity of the lands of the Crown of St. Stephen should in no way 
be disturbed”. 7   is would entail the preservation of the Austro-Hungarian 
dualist state organisation, so abhorred by the Slav politicians. Korošec found 
such a solution unacceptable.8
 e Habsburg crown was no longer of any interest to the most Slovene 
and Croatian politicians. In the capacity of President of the SHS-National 
Council, Korošec set out from Vienna to Geneva to attend a conference with 
the Serbian Prime Minister Nikola Pašić and the President of the emigrant 
Yugoslav Committee Ante Trumbić.9 As Korošec himself later recounted, the 
last Austrian Imperial Prime Minister Heinrich Lammasch had implored him 
even on the eve of his departure to Switzerland to comply with the Emperor’s 
demand and enter the coalition cabinet, which would see to the reorganisation 
of the state into a confederation. But Korošec remained  rm in his resolve.10
4 Andrej RAHTEN, Od Majniške deklaracije do habsburške detronizacije. Slovenska politika v času 
zadnjega habsburškega vladarja Karla, Celje: Celjska Mohorjeva, 2016, 282. 
5  Vasilij MELIK, „Die Reformpläne Österreich-Ungarns und die Slowenen“, in Mitteleuropa-Konzeptionen 
in der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts, (ed.) Richard G. PLASCHKA et al., Vienna: Österreichische 
Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1995, 77–80.
6 Vlasta STAVBAR, Majniška deklaracija in deklaracijsko gibanje, Maribor: Založba Pivec, 2017, 79–88.
7 For a more detailed discussion on the manifesto see Helmut RUMPLER, Das Völkermanifest Kaiser 
Karls vom 16. Oktober 1918. Letzter Versuch zur Rettung der Habsburgermonarchie, Munich: Verlag für 
Geschichte und Politik, 1966.
8 Građa o stvaranju jugoslovenske države (1. 1.–20. 12. 1918), (ed.) Dragoslav JANKOVIĆ-Bogdan 
KRIZMAN, vol. 1–2, Belgrade: Institut društvenih nauka, 1964, here vol. 2, 373–374. 
9 Feliks J. BISTER, „Delovanje dr. Antona Korošca od majniške deklaracije do 1. 12. 1918”, Zgodovinski 
časopis 1/1990, 73–90, here 87.
10 RAHTEN, Od Majniške deklaracije do habsburške detronizacije, 182–183.
1716
Časopis za povijest Zapadne Hrvatske, XII./12., 2017. 
O okruglim obljetnicama / On round-number anniversaries
Andrej RAHTEN
Anton Korošec and the “Croatian Question” in Yugoslavia
By the end of October 1918, the Slovene political leaders removed the 
portraits of the Emperor Karl from their apartments.  e more far-sighted, 
however, had already replaced them – with the portraits of King Peter I and 
the heir to the throne Alexander Karađorđević.  e reasons for so doing were 
more than obvious.  e Slovenes could only helplessly observe while Italy was 
grabbing Slovene territory piece by piece, in line with the infamous London 
Pact concluded with the Entente Powers in April 1915. To make the situation 
even worse, Carinthia witnessed a new increase in con dence among German 
nationalists after a short period of decline. Under those circumstances the 
Kingdom of Serbia was, in fact, the only state to o er military support for the 
realisation of Slovene territorial claims.  erefore, representatives of the Slovene 
political elite probably had no other alternative but to lean on the Serbian state 
of the Karađorđević dynasty. However, the irrefutable fact remains that they 
knew absolutely nothing about their ally.11
When Korošec entered the negotiation arena in Geneva, he simply could 
not believe Trumbić, who warned him of Pašić’s “Balkan methods”.12 When 
it  nally became clear to him it was too late. Serbian diplomats welcomed 
Korošec in Switzerland with open arms, patting him on the back for the great 
service he had done in the Vienna Parliament for the “Yugoslav cause”. And 
they were even more pleased to hear him say that he was in favour of a monarchy 
and “has embraced the idea of a uni ed state”.13 Allegedly, the President of the 
SHS-National Council arrived at the Geneva Conference, which started on 
6 November 1918, as “an adamant centralist”.14 Nevertheless, he gradually 
moved closer to the view of Trumbić’s Yugoslav Committee advocating a 
federative form of the state. On 9 November Korošec and Trumbić eventually 
succeeded in persuading Pašić into signing the Geneva Agreement. Its provisions 
stipulated the establishment of a state whose organisation would in many 
ways correspond to the dualist system of Austria-Hungary.  ey, furthermore, 
envisaged the formation of a joint government in which half of all ministers 
would be appointed by the Serbian government and swear allegiance to the 
Serbian King Peter Karađorđević, whereas the other half would be delegated by 
the SHS-National Council and swear allegiance in the presence of Korošec.15 
However, the signed agreement remained a dead letter. Stojan Protić, Pašić’s 
deputy, resigned in protest as early as 11 November 1918. His resignation was 
followed by the resignation of the entire Serbian government – and with it 
the annulment of the agreement with the representatives of the SHS-National 
11 France DOLINAR, Odsotnost slovenske državne misli v prevratu 1918, Buenos Aires: Založba SIJ, 1971. 
12 Silvo KRANJEC, “Koroščevo predavanje o postanku Jugoslavije”, Zgodovinski časopis 16/1962, 218–
229, here 226.
13 Momčilo ZEČEVIĆ, Slovenska ljudska stranka in jugoslovansko zedinjenje 1917–1921. Od majniške 
deklaracije do vidovdanske ustave, Maribor: Obzorja, 1977, 142–143.
14 Quoted from an entry in Izidor Cankar’s notebook, Archives of the Republic of Slovenia, Personal 
Collection of Izidor Cankar, fascicle 1.
15 ZEČEVIĆ, Slovenska ljudska stranka, 152.
Council and the Yugoslav Committee.16 But the unpleasant surprises did not 
end there.
 e Vice-President of the SHS-National Council Svetozar Pribićević 
made excellent use of Korošec’s absence in Zagreb to follow his plans and 
achieve a speedy uni cation with Serbia. After a rather long hesitation of his 
Croat-Serbian coalition, Pribićević quickly took over the reins, pressing for 
the earliest possible uni cation with Belgrade.17 Korošec’s arrival from abroad 
was much delayed, so he was only able to return to Ljubljana one day after the 
fateful First of December Proclamation of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats 
and Slovenes. Nevertheless, in a statement to one Croatian newspaper he said 
that he approved of the address of the SHS-National Council and that the 
Regent’s statement “satis ed him /.../ completely”. Korošec and his adherents 
were left with no other alternative but to believe Alexander’s guarantees. 
 e latter received Korošec in audience on 6 December 1918. Korošec was 
rewarded for his cooperativeness with the position of Vice-President in the  rst 
joint Ministerial Council of the SHS-Kingdom, which was appointed on 20 
December 1918.18 
 e  rst years in the SHS-Kingdom already held many disappointments 
for the Slovene politicians, even though the All-Slovene People’s Party, led 
by Korošec, initially appeared to adapt well to the new situation. Korošec 
remained an in uential  gure in politics and managed to establish in the 
Belgrade National Assembly a new version of Yugoslav Club.19 After his  rst 
visit to Belgrade, the Bishop of Ljubljana, Anton Bonaventura Jeglič was 
extremely pleased with the role which Korošec’s parliamentary club had in state 
politics: “Our Yugoslav Club headed by Korošec’s deputies, has a tremendous 
reputation. Korošec is the most popular man in Serbia; they are particularly 
delighted to see him organise food supplies e ectively, and punish and remove 
many swindlers.”20
In the new state, Korošec pragmatically tied the fate of his All-Slovene 
People’s Party to agreements with the leader of the Serbian Radicals, Nikola 
Pašić, and the leader of the Democrats, Ljuba Davidović. He most likely 
assumed that at least one of them would remain in power throughout the reign 
of the Serbian Dynasty, irrespective of the government’s composition. But of 
course it was not only the leadership of the All-Slovene People’s Party, which 
was due to the diplomatic loss of the Littoral and Carinthia soon renamed the 
Slovene People’s Party, that succumbed to “Serbian charm”. Slovene liberals, 
having united in the Yugoslav Democratic Party just before the disintegration 
16 Olga POPOVIĆ, Stojan Protić i ustavno rešenje nacionalnog pitanja u Kraljevini SHS, Belgrade: 
Savremena administracija, 1988, 22–23.
17 Hrvoje MATKOVIĆ, Svetozar Pribićević. Ideolog – stranački vođa – emigrant, Zagreb: Hrvatska 
sveučilišna naklada, 55–61. 
18 ZEČEVIĆ, Slovenska ljudska stranka, 182–200.
19 Andrej RAHTEN, Slovenska ljudska stranka v beograjski skupščini. Jugoslovanski klub v 
parlamentarnem življenju Kraljevine SHS 1919–1929, Ljubljana: Založba ZRC, 2002.
20 ZEČEVIĆ, Slovenska ljudska stranka, 273.
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of Austria-Hungary, linked up with Pribićević. Nevertheless, the formula 
envisaging a single “triune nation” at the time also engaged the leaders of the 
Slovene People’s Party. Such thinking, among others, was re ected in the action 
that Korošec took during the session of the interim national representative 
body on the veri cation of mandates, when he interrupted the reading of the 
Slovene version of the report made by the veri cation section on 12 March 
1919, saying: “that all Slovenes understood the Serbo-Croatian language and 
proposed that the reading be dispensed with.”21 In brief, the leaders of the 
two most powerful Slovene parties actually competed in who would exhibit a 
greater degree of commitment to the “triune nation”.
However, not all members of the Slovene People’s Party greeted 
Korošec’s consorting with the Belgrade behind-the-scene-circles of ćaršija with 
enthusiasm. A priest Matija Škerbec later accused his chairman of ruining the 
political concept of solidarity with the Croatian Rightists and the peasant 
movement of Stjepan Radić, which the Slovene Catholic patriots had built 
prior to the Great War.22 And rightfully so, because without the alliance with 
Radić’s Croatian Republican Peasant Party Korošec could not rely on a broad 
Croatian support for his policies. It should be borne in mind that Radić won 
most of the Croatian population to his side with his charisma and radical 
slogans directed against the centralist policy of Yugoslav unitarists and Greater 
Serbian circles. Even though he had been considered a friend of the Slovene 
Catholic patriots in the Habsburg Monarchy, the formation of the new state 
brought about a reversal of the relations between the former allies. 
Rivals and foes: Korošec and Radić
 e Slovene and Croatian transition from the Austro-Hungarian to 
Yugoslav state framework entailed the breakdown of a majority of traditional 
coalitions having been built between Slovene and Croatian political parties 
during the Austro-Hungarian period.23 Alliances that seemed utterly 
impossible during the days of the Habsburg reign became a constant in the 
political life of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. And vice versa: 
former allies were now set against each other as adversaries and enemies.
On 16 January 1919, a delegation of Radić’s party came to Ljubljana to 
reach an agreement with Korošec’s party on future cooperation, but returned 
to Zagreb empty-handed, after the Slovenes assured them “that they adamantly 
insisted on the proclaimed national unity and uni cation, and considered the 
21 RAHTEN, Slovenska ljudska stranka, 40–41.
22 Matija ŠKERBEC, Pregled zgodovine novodobnega slovenskega katoliškega gibanja, vol. 1–2, 
Cleveland: Samozaložba, 1956–1957, here vol. 2, 124.
23 For a more detailed evaluation of the Croat-Slovene cooperation in the Habsburg Monarchy see Andrej 
RAHTEN, Savezništva i diobe. Razvoj slovensko-hrvatskih političkih odnosa u Habsburškoj Monarhiji 
1848.–1918., Zagreb: Golden Marketing – Tehnička knjiga, 2008.
current situation as a fully implemented self-determination of our nation”.24 
 e abortive meeting was followed by Radić’s caustic attacks on Korošec and 
his “clericals”.  e Croatian tribune could soon read the response to his conduct 
in the leading newspaper Slovenec, charging him with the responsibility for 
the “Croatian chaos”.  e old sympathies no longer su  ced for the Slovene 
People’s Party to support Radić’s struggle against the Greater Serbian circles, 
for his fear of Greater Serbia was considered “downright naïve”. Korošec’s party 
furthermore condemned Radić’s pro-republican orientation, even though there 
were a considerable number of republicans within its own ranks. According to 
the daily Slovenec, this was a “tragedy of a talented person, but also a tragedy of 
a party condemned to unimportance and subjection to mockery”.25
But Korošec was not the only culprit for the deteriorating relations 
between the Slovene People’s Party and Radić’s movement.  e fact is that 
Radić’s anti-clerical statements and calls for the establishment of a republic had 
greatly curtailed the possibilities for cooperation with Korošec, who was a priest 
and a monarchist.  e Croatian tribune, furthermore, hardly contributed to 
the warming of relations by tenacious agitating in Prekmurje.26 At the meeting 
of his followers in Ljubljana on 23 November 1924, Korošec accused Radić of 
attempting to usurp Prekmurje, “place it in the Croatian national and cultural 
circle” and then ultimately “harness the Slovenes to the Croatian carriage”. 
Korošec could not hide his exasperation over Radić’s manoeuvres, which he 
described as “ugly imperialism”. He made it perfectly clear to the Croatian 
tribune as to where the region of Prekmurje belonged: “Prekmurje was Slovene-
minded in the past as it continues to be Slovene-minded today and it shall 
never forsake the Slovene community. And all the Slovenes will stand as a 
watchful guard so that no one can rob us of our beautiful Prekmurje.”27
But even though Korošec was willing to somehow overlook the attacks 
of the Croatian leader, who would, moreover, very often radically change his 
opinions, he disposed of very limited opportunities to cooperate with him. As 
an adversary of political Catholicism, Radić also opposed the Croatian People’s 
Party – a faithful ally to the Slovene People’s Party – making it understandably 
hard for Korošec to associate with its bitter election rival.
Loyal allies:  e Croatian People’s Party
Leaders of the Slovene People’s Party were much more successful in 
developing liaisons with the political wing of the Croatian Catholic movement 
– the Croatian People’s Party, established in May 1919.28 One of the leaders 
24 “Odposlanci Hrvatske seljačke stranke v Ljubljani”, Slovenec, 17 January 1919, 3.
25 “Hrvatski kaos”, Slovenec, 5 February 1919, 1.
26 Katja PERŠAK, “Anton Korošec in slovensko-hrvaška nasprotja v Prekmurju”, Pilar, 7–8/2009, 133–150. 
27 “Volivni govor dr. Korošca”, Slovenec, 25 November 1924, 1.
28 Zlatko MATIJEVIĆ, Slom politike katoličkog jugoslavenstva. Hrvatska pučka stranka u političkom 
životu Kraljevine SHS (1919.–1929.), Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest – Dom i svijet, 1998. 
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of the political wing of the Croatian Catholic movement, Janko Šimrak, 
attended the meeting of the Slovene Catholic patriots in mid-February 1919 in 
Ljubljana. In his speech he welcomed the party’s intentions “to expand across 
the entire territory of Yugoslavia” and gather “everything that is Christian and 
democratic” in the state.29 
 e Croatian People’s Party remained an unfailingly loyal ally to Korošec 
in the Belgrade Parliament. In early March 1919, Croatian deputies, Janko 
Šimrak, Stanko Banić and Velimir Deželić Jr., helped the Slovene Catholic 
patriots to establish the Yugoslav Club.30  ere was no doubt about who was 
to be elected President of the Club – it was Korošec, while the vice-Presidency 
over the 19-member body was assigned to Šimrak.31 On 11 April 1919, the 
Yugoslav Club adopted a decision to accede to the establishment of a Yugoslav 
party “that will endeavour in the cultural  eld for religious education of the 
nation in observance of autonomous religious beliefs”.  e party was primarily 
to represent the interests of peasants, workers and tradesmen. Its constitutional 
programme was to draw on the principle of “state and national unity” and 
envisaged “an internal organisation of the state on the basis of cultural, as well 
as economic and geographic conditions”.32
As part of his e orts to establish a Yugoslav People’s Party, Korošec 
visited Dalmatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in late April and early May 1919.33 
 e Dalmatian tour started on 26 April in Split and continued to Sinj and 
Trogir. Korošec visited Dalmatian towns in the company of Stanko Banić and 
Petar Rogulja. At every destination, the President of the Yugoslav Club was 
greeted by cheering and showered with  owers.34  e Split-based newspaper 
Jadran described his visit in nothing but superlatives: “Never will Dalmatia 
forget /…/ how he [Korošec] and his memorable friend [Janez Evangelist] 
Krek have at all times stood for this godforsaken province. He is coming to 
us as the bearer of new ideas, power and order in the state. He preceded by 
announcing the revision of nutrition o  ces, suspensions and arrests of highest 
ranking o  cers who have sinned against the people.  e people rejoice and 
welcome him as their steadfast representative and liberator.”35
On 29 April 1919, Korošec attended the inaugural meeting of the 
Croatian People’s Party for Dalmatia.36 In a brief speech he outlined the 
objectives of the Yugoslav People’s Party which should be established in the 
near future: “By planning to establish this party we are demonstrating that 
our work has not been accomplished by the liberation struggle. /…/ We have 
29 “Zborovanje vodstva V. L. S.”, Slovenec, 21 February 1919, 2.
30 Neda ENGELSFELD, Prvi parlament Kraljestva Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca – Privremeno narodno 
predstavništvo, Zagreb: Globus, 1989, 112; MATIJEVIĆ, Slom, 131.
31 “Strankarske razmere v parlamentu”, Slovenec, 7 March 1919, 1.
32 “Jugoslovanska ljudska stranka”, Slovenec, 12 April 1919, 1.
33 ZEČEVIĆ, Slovenska ljudska stranka, 244–245, 254 and 257–258; MATIJEVIĆ, Slom, 92–106.
34 “Dr. Korošec v Dalmaciji”, Slovenec, 30 April 1919, 3.
35 “Politične novice”, Slovenec, 3 May 1919, 2.
36 “Hrvatska ljudska stranka v Dalmaciji”, Slovenec, 4 May 1919, 4.
liberated and created a homeland, and we seek cooperation. Our party wishes 
this state to become a home to all those who faithfully build on positive 
Christian principles. Drawing from eternal Christian principles the state must 
make arrangements for public and social work practices. We are not saying that 
we are alone in this cause. We salute anyone who shares the same Christian 
principles.  ey are welcome among us or to work with us. We are reproached 
for being a clerical, church party. To this we respond that we are a politically 
completely independent party that pursues its public activities on the basis of 
Christian principles. We are not set against other confessions; to the contrary, 
we shall join hands with Orthodox Christians and Muslims. We shall reach 
out to all those who are oppressed and downtrodden. Our principal idea is to 
help individuals, the poor and needy.”37 
On 2 May 1919, Korošec visited Sarajevo, where he met with high 
dignitaries of the Catholic Church and political adherents who had laid 
the foundations of the Croatian People’s Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Despite initial organisational successes in setting up the Croatian People’s 
Party in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the ultimate establishment of a 
united Yugoslav party on Catholic principles never took place. Even within 
the Yugoslav Club both sister parties opted to retain their individuality. 
Notwithstanding, the Slovene People’s Party continued to support its Croatian 
ally in its e orts to increase its in uence among the Croatian people.  is 
is also why the members of the Croatian People’s Party were often attacked 
by their adversaries for being nothing more than an appendage to Korošec’s 
“clericals”.38
Opposition years: Korošec against Pašić
Nikola Pašić, an elder among the Serbian politicians, took excellent 
advantage of the Slovene-Croatian disputes during the process of forming the 
constitution of the new state.  e struggle of the opposition parties against the 
informal coalition of the Greater Serbian nationalists and Yugoslav unitarists 
was completely uncoordinated. Refusing to pledge allegiance to the Serbian 
King, Radić and his  fty deputies declined cooperation in the Constituent 
Assembly, while the remaining Croatian deputies spent a long time trying to 
persuade the government to ful ll the Croatian demands through consensus 
rather than by dictate. But Pašić  atly ignored their demands.  e deputies of 
the Yugoslav Club were the last to leave the Assembly on 14 June 1921. With 
the main part of the opposition thus out of the way and with the support from 
the representatives of the Yugoslav Muslim Organisation, Pašić ultimately 
secured himself a de nitive majority.39
37 “Politične novice”, Slovenec, 6 May 1919, 3.
38 MATIJEVIĆ, Slom, 106–109.
39 DJOKIĆ, Elusive Compromise, 47.
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 e constitution was adopted on 28 June 1921 – on Vidov dan or St. 
Vitus’ Day.  e Serbian national holiday was therefore another fatal blow to 
the Slovenes and Croats. Precisely seven years after the day of the assassination 
of Francis Ferdinand, whose death had shattered the dreams of the Slovene 
and Croatian politicians about a state administration reform of the Habsburg 
Monarchy, Regent Alexander proclaimed a constitution that subjugated the 
Slovenes and Croats to Greater Serbian hegemony.  e newspaper of the 
People’s Radical Party, Samouprava, described the constitution as a Serbian 
national victory which had restored their “Tsardom”.40 Korošec’s adherents saw 
the Vidovdan Constitution as “the negation of our national individuality, which 
has in icted a mortal wound on the genius of our nation”. At that moment 
“the struggle” began “for our national existence, which was not immediately 
evident but carefully concealed, covert and hence all the more treacherous”.41 
Such manoeuvres performed by Pašić and his allies occasionally prompted 
even the proverbially tolerant Korošec to take a stand against his Serbian 
colleagues.  e Slovene People’s Party thus remained in the opposition till 
January 1927. 
One of Korošec’s crucial public appearances in which he minutely 
described the Slovene disappointment with their position in the Yugoslav 
state was the speech given in the National Assembly on 8 February 1926. 
On that occasion Korošec concluded “that Slovenia was overtaxed, that 
budgetary burdens were excessive, that taxes were exacted in a relentless, one 
might say more than rigorous manner, and that Slovenia was neglected and 
marginalised”. He stressed that despite their “close ethnic relation to the Serbs 
and Croats”, the Slovenes nevertheless considered themselves as “a nation in 
its own right”. Embracing the thesis on “national unity” meant relinquishing 
their own, already established culture and language. Korošec appealed to 
the Serbian deputies that they should have the same understanding as the 
Slovenes had for the Serbian policy in Macedonia: “None of the nations in 
our state understands the struggle for Macedonia better than we do, because 
we know that with every man lost to it, we lose a piece of our heart and a 
drop of blood from our body. If you are so intransigent and unwilling to lose 
Macedonia to another, likewise, brotherly nation, then let us follow your suit 
and  ght for our national individuality, our national rights and our national 
existence.” Korošec stressed that the Slovene nation demanded a “united 
Slovenia” with “substantial and broad autonomy”. He rejected the claims that 
the Slovene demands were unreasonable: “We are not being intransigent by 
trying to make you realise that we demand a united Slovenia because we 
wish to share a common existence and because the state cannot a ord to 
be indi erent whether Slovenia is a culturally thriving, progressive, uni ed 
and free bulwark against Italy and Austria.” He continued in a sharper tone, 
40 BANAC, Nacionalno pitanje, 376.
41 Janko BREJC, “Od prevrata do ustave”, Avstrijski in jugoslovanski državni problem. Tri razprave Janka 
Brejca iz prelomnega obdobja narodne zgodovine, (ed.) Andrej RAHTEN, Ljubljana: Založba ZRC, 21–74, here 25.
which drew several interjections from the Serbian deputies: “Look at the 
situation in the state today:  e Serbs are wielding their power, the Croats are 
talking, and we are paying – while the Germans, Hungarians and Muslims 
are taking action. /.../ Your population amounts to 43%, and yet it has come 
so far that you have no less than two thirds of deputies in the Assembly. What 
is more, you have your King.”  e Serbian deputies interrupted him: “Isn’t 
he also your King?” Korošec’s answer was  rm: “Yes, he is also our King, 
but not a Slovene, this you have to admit: We certainly recognise him as the 
King of our state, but he is not a King of Slovene birth.” Korošec pointed to 
the marginalisation of the Slovenes in the public administration, which he 
supported with concrete numbers: “ e Government is exclusively Serbian, 
diplomacy is predominantly Serbian, the General Sta  is exclusively Serbian, 
and the central administration is 98% Serbian; the gendarmerie is more than 
60% Serbian and growing more so every day, the customs administration is 
70% Serbian and likewise the state  nancial service. Seeing that individual 
branches of the state administration are growing more Serbian with each 
passing day gnaws not only at our nerves but at our bread and butter. In the 
light of high unemployment, which drives our people away to America and 
to seek seasonal work in every possible country, at least allow us to earn our 
living in our own state.”42
However, forging a coalition between Korošec and Radić remained 
“mission impossible”. Instead, the two national leaders confronted each 
other again and again. Korošec was furious when Radić entered the coalition 
with Pašić in July 1925. And Radić did not hesitate to  ght against Korošec 
ferociously when the Slovene People’s Party entered the Uzunović cabinet in 
February 1927.43 
Prime Minister against Croatian will
On 20 June 1928, a Montenegrin deputy, Puniša Račić, settled his 
scores with the opponents from Radić’s party with a pistol, killing two and 
in icting serious injuries to Stjepan Radić. Immediately after the assassination 
allegations emerged in the press that Korošec, the then Interior Minister, 
knew what was happening but did nothing to prevent it. While there is no 
proof of his involvement, a record has been preserved about his conversation 
with Račić on the eve of the assassination in which he was told that there 
was going to be an “accident”.44 However, regardless of the allegations and 
42 “Proračunski govor dr. Antona Korošca”, Slovenec, 9 February 1926, 1.
43  Aleksandra BERBERIH-SLANA, “Minister Stjepan Radić in Slovenci”, Stiplovškov zbornik, (ed.) 
Dušan NEĆAK, Ljubljana: Filozofska fakulteta, 2005, 237–266; Andrej RAHTEN, “Radić na štajerski fronti. 
Hrvaško-slovenska politična razmerja v mariborskem volilnem okrožju v Kraljevini SHS”, Studia Historica 
Slovenica 1/2018, 173–192.
44 Stanko MAJCEN, “Moji spomini na Antona Korošca”, in Zbrano delo, vol. 4 (Ljubljana 1996), 313–
348, here 337. 
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the extremely volatile political situation in the wake of the assassination, it 
was precisely Korošec who ultimately saved the King and the state from the 
impending crisis.
Rudolf Hanželič, a  eology teacher at the Celje First Grammar School 
and a member of Korošec’s round table of friends at the Abbey of Celje, 
would hear Korošec talk about it in person. Immediately after the tragedy in 
Parliament, the king stated that he would allow the amputation of Croatian 
and Slovene territories, to which Korošec replied: “Your Highness, you will 
not.” When the King asked him why, the Slovene leader said: “Because you 
are too intelligent.”  e amputation was allegedly not the King’s idea but, 
as Korošec believed, advocated by the “court camarilla”. Alexander inquired 
what camarilla, anxiously lighting one cigarette after another. He had barely 
lit the  rst one and he already threw it on the Persian rug. Korošec bent down, 
picked up the cigarette and put it in an ashtray.  e same repeated  ve times 
or so.  ey looked at each other in silence for a long moment: two founding 
fathers of Yugoslavia, facing the biggest crisis in its history yet.  en Alexander 
placed his hand on the priest’s shoulder and said calmly: “Father, you shall be 
my Prime Minister.”45
On 27 July 1928 a Prime Minister of Slovene descent became the head 
of the Ministerial Council of the SHS-Kingdom for the  rst time in history. 
Even though he had secured a place in his government for the leader of the 
Croatian People’s Party Stjepan Barić, Korošec faced sharp accusations from 
the Croatian public for exploiting the Croats in his machinations with the 
Serbs.46 Radić’s successor, Vladko Maček, born of a Slovene father, argued that 
in the struggle between the East and West Korošec had positioned himself 
“where he had no place either as a man of West European civilisation or a 
Slovene, and even less a Catholic priest”.47 Allegations of Korošec’s coming 
to terms with the dynasty often also assumed irrational dimensions. But the 
fact remains that the Slovene leader felt that the Yugoslav state, which he had 
co-created, found itself at a crucial juncture in history. During the days when 
revisionist forces were overtly expressing their ambitions on practically the 
entire Yugoslav borders and the state was facing the threat of internal political 
con ict of major proportions, Korošec knew it was high time to take pragmatic 
and swift solutions. Even when King Alexander introduced dictatorship on 6 
January 1929, Korošec endorsed it and joined it as Minister of Forests and 
Mines.
45 Rudolf HANŽELIČ, “O dr. Antonu Korošcu”, Zbornik Svobodne Slovenije 23/1977, 295–302.
46 “Vlada dr. Antona Korošca”, Slovenec, 28 July 1928, 1.
47 “Za svobodno Slovenijo”, Kmetski list, 31 October 1928. 
Korošec at the zenith of his political power
 e initial enthusiasm over the imposition of the “Sixth of January 
Dictatorship” soon gave way to disillusionment with the King’s actions. Since 
all parties with religious or “nationalist” foundations were legally abolished, the 
Slovene People’s Party was dissolved as well. Even though the newly established 
Dravska banovina with its seat in Ljubljana had restricted jurisdiction, the 
Slovene politicians sought comfort in the fact that at it least encompassed 
almost an entire Slovene ethnic territory in Yugoslavia. 48 Although Korošec 
publicly expressed loyal support for the King’s actions, in private he was 
deeply concerned by the development of the state. On 28 September 1930 
he eventually resigned as Minister, while his adherents continued supporting 
the government for a while.  e King decided to restore constitutional and 
parliamentary life, yet the new legislation only further centralised the state. 
 e election was public, and only parties whose candidates covered the entire 
state’s territory were eligible for participation.  erefore Korošec and the former 
Slovene People’s Party did not partake in the election which took place on 8 
November 1931 and, together with other opposition groups in the state, opted 
to call for abstention instead.49  e regime pressure on Korošec increased and 
ultimately unleashed a wave of spontaneous anti-regime demonstrations in 
May 1932, on the celebration of Korošec’s sixtieth anniversary.50  e abolished 
Slovene national  ags were  uttering again.
In November 1932 the former and likewise disbanded Croatian Peasant 
Party and its political allies adopted the Zagreb Points demanding the year of 
1918 to be recognised as the starting point for further negotiations. Serbian 
political groups too started voicing their programming statements. 51 Korošec 
did not wait long. He summoned a meeting of the leadership of the former 
party and by New Year’s Day issued the Ljubljana Points, later known mostly 
as the Slovene Declaration, demanding “national individuality, a name,  ag, 
an ethnic community,  nancial independence and cultural freedom” for 
the Slovenes. Korošec is said to have given his colleagues the instructions to 
“deliver him a plan and explain the conditions” for Slovene independence.52 
Regime measures against the advocates of the Slovene Declaration followed 
soon. Korošec was  rst con ned to the Sanatorium at Vrnjačka banja. He 
48 Law on the Name and Division of the Kingdom in Administrative Areas of 3 October 1929 granted the 
district of Črnomelj to the Savska banovina, but that only lasted until the adoption of the octroyed Constitution 
in 1931. Lovro BOGATAJ, “Uprava dravske banovine,” Krajevni leksikon dravske banovine, Ljubljana: Zveza 
za tujski promet za Slovenijo v Ljubljani, 1937, 1–8, here 1.
49 Jure GAŠPARIČ, Diktatura kralja Aleksandra in politika Slovenske ljudske stranke v letih 1929–1935 
Ljubljana: Modrijan, 2007, 121–135. Even Robert William Seton-Watson, a great advocate of a Yugoslav state, 
described the King’s abolition of parliamentarianism and political parties as “sheer absolutism, unacceptable 
for an adherent of any kind of free institution”. Ibid, 69.
50 Janko PRUNK, “Anton Korošec v opoziciji 1930–1934,” Časopis za zgodovino in narodopisje 
2–3/2006, 83–91.
51 DJOKIĆ, Elusive Compromise, 131–137.
52 Andrej RAHTEN, Izidor Cankar – diplomat dveh Jugoslavij/A Diplomat of Two Yugoslavias, Mengeš – 
Ljubljana: Center za evropsko prihodnost – ZRC SAZU, 2009, 260.
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was soon transferred to Tuzla and therefrom to the island of Hvar for medical 
reasons.53
On 9 October 1934 Yugoslavia was shocked by the assassination of King 
Alexander in Marseilles. He became the victim of his own erroneous approach 
to striking an agreement among the nations under his rule.  e assassination 
also enabled the return of Korošec from Hvar.  e leader of the banned 
Slovene People’s Party made a great comeback. He established ties with the 
cousin of the assassinated King, Prince Paul, who de facto assumed leadership 
over the three-member regency during the minority of the young heir to the 
throne, Peter, and thus decisively determined the course of the state’s politics. 
Korošec played his usual card of cooperating with the Serbian political elite 
and joined forces with Milan Stojadinović, former Minister of Finances in 
the Pašić governments. His authority and long experience again made him 
one of the most in uential political  gures in the state. He incorporated the 
former Slovene People’s Party into the coalition with Stojadinović’s Radicals 
and Muslim politicians from Bosnia and Herzegovina under the leadership 
of Mehmed Spaho.  e result was the establishment of the Yugoslav Radical 
Union. 54 But this was, then, yet another transformation of Korošec’s political 
pragmatism, which e ectively favoured tactics over programme.
Korošec was at the zenith of his political power. In the period of 1935–
1938, during which he sat in the government as Minister of Interior, he was 
the most in uential statesman, next to Prime Minister Stojadinović, and, of 
course, the Prince Regent. Stojadinović learnt that to his own cost, when on 
the eve of the Second World War, he and Korošec went their separate political 
ways. Although the Dravska banovina encompassed most of Slovene ethnic 
territory in Yugoslavia, Korošec was not entirely satis ed with its existing 
competences.55  erefore, he endeavoured to strengthen Slovene autonomy 
also within the framework of the Yugoslav Radical Union’s regime and with 
a more or less tacit blessing of Prince Paul. In the shadow of the rising  ird 
Reich, Slovenia was thus well on its way to obtain more attributes of autonomy. 
Nevertheless, Korošec was aware of the fact that without the solution of the 
“Croatian Question” the stability of the state could not be preserved.
Establishment of the banovina of Croatia
Prince Paul lamented the key weakness of the Yugoslav Radical Union 
– the failure to incorporate the former Croatian Peasant Party under Maček’s 
authoritative leadership. Stojadinović turned out not to be the most suitable 
man for striking a compromise with the Croats.  is must have also been clear 
53 GAŠPARIČ, SLS, 178–179.
54 MATKOVIĆ, Povijest Jugoslavije, 184–187.
55 Miroslav STIPLOVŠEK, “Anton Korošec in prizadevanja Slovenske ljudske stranke za uresničenje 
narodne avtonomije”, Časopis za zgodovino in narodopisje 2–3/2006, 122–137.
to Paul, who then entrusted Korošec with the task of examining all possible 
options for a constitutional reform. Korošec asked four eminent legal counsels 
to draw up their opinions for the prince.  e counsels unanimously found 
no legal impediment to the constitutional change, even during the period 
of regency on behalf of the minor king. While performing his mission as a 
mediator, Korošec also established contacts with Ivan Šubašić, who acted as 
Maček’s informal liaison o  cer. 56
In the National Assembly election held in December 1938, the Slovene 
part of the Yugoslav Radical Union led by Korošec, who had an excellent 
overview of the events as Minister of Interior, won more than 78% of votes 
in the Dravska banovina.57 Maček’s result was even better: 767,000 Croats 
gave him vote, as opposed to 32,000 Croat votes for the government.58  e 
Prime Minister then wrote a letter to the Regent, expressing dissatisfaction 
with Korošec’s excessive leniency towards the opposition.59 On 21 December 
1938 Korošec was removed from the government and appointed President of 
the Senate.
Nevertheless, Korošec was not easy to be rid of. On 3 February 1939  ve 
Ministers o ered their resignation; o  cially because of the unsolved “Croatian 
Question”.60 Korošec, who still harboured the memory of Stojadinović having 
removed him from the ministerial cabinet to the position of the President 
of the Senate, was the one who masterminded the conspiracy with Prince 
Paul’s support. 61 Following the fall of the Stojadinović’s government in early 
February 1939 and the appointment of Dragiša Cvetković as the new Prime 
Minister, the settlement of the “Croatian Question” was o  cially moved to 
the top of the government’s agenda.62 
One of the leading Catholic patriots Matija Škerbec, albeit a most 
adamant critic of Korošec, described the situation as follows: “ at Dr. 
Korošec was a true master of ‘corridor politics’ who knew how to jerk the rug 
under someone’s feet was perhaps best demonstrated when he hurled Prime 
Minister Stojadinović to the  oor.  e entire Belgrade laughed at the incident 
and admired Korošec’s agility. Serbian notabilities would say to me in the 
Belgrade prison in 1932: ‘He’s a maestro indeed!’ Many Serbs regarded him as 
the greatest Yugoslav politician, the only one who could cope with the Serbian 
machinations, once he had become accustomed to the conditions in Serbia 
and Belgrade.”63 
56 DJOKIĆ, Elusive Compromise, 115.
57 Janko PRUNK, »Slovenska parlamentarna izkušnja v prvi Jugoslaviji (1918 – 1941), Parlamentarna izkušnja 
Slovencev, (ed.) Janko PRUNK-Cirila TOPLAK, Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede, 2005, 81–130, here 128.
58 DJOKIĆ, Elusive Compromise, 187.
59 Ciril ŽEBOT, Neminljiva Slovenija. Spomini in spoznanja iz razdobja sedemdesetih let od Majniške 
deklaracije, Ljubljana: Magellan, 1990, 138.  
60 MATKOVIĆ, Povijest Jugoslavije, 201.
61 Jacob B. HOPTNER, Jugoslavija u krizi 1934–1941, Rijeka: Otokar Keršovani, 1973, 146–150; Ljubo 
BOBAN, Sporazum Cvetković-Maček, Beograd: Institut društvenih nauka, 1965, 79–80.
62 Korošec’s party was represented in the government by Miha Krek and Franc Snoj. 
63 ŠKERBEC, Pregled, vol. 2, 118.
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Stojadinović’s fall met with an unfavourable reaction in Germany, 
notwithstanding that the Cvetković’s government was even more favourable to 
the  ird Reich policy.  e crucial test for the new government was posed by 
the “Croatian Question”, which seriously threatened the state consolidation. 
 e task facing the Cvetković’s cabinet was anything but easy. In addition 
to the vengeful Stojadinović, who had later established his own party, the 
agreement with the Croats was also countered by the Serbian Cultural Club, 
which was established in 1937 and pursued the motto “All Serbs, unite!”.64 
Initially, the reports which appeared in the daily Slovenec on the necessity 
to strike a Croatian-Serbian agreement leave no doubt that Korošec, too, 
supported the convergence of the government’s and Maček’s positions. Paul 
exerted every e ort to reach an agreement with the Croatian politicians, 
but ultimately came to the conclusion that “they abhorred the Slovenes and 
Korošec”.  e latter, however, equally ill-disposed towards the Croatian leader 
Maček, compared his demand to unite all Croatian ethnic territories into a 
single entity to Hitler’s “banditry”.65
According to Joško Krošelj, Korošec’s former personal secretary and 
later editor of Slovenec in Belgrade, Cvetković kept the President of the Senate 
regularly informed about the course of negotiations. However, being gradually 
pulled into Maček’s line of reasoning, Cvetković reduced his meetings with 
Korošec to a mere formality. In those days, Maček talked with a deep suspicion 
in his intimate circles about Korošec; on one occasion, he even described him 
as a “gangster”. In Maček’s opinion, the agreement was a matter that rested 
entirely with the Serbs and Croats, while the Slovenes were of secondary 
importance.  e Yugoslav problem could hence be solved exclusively through 
a “dualist understanding”. Maček’s newspapers wrote that the Slovenes had 
no place intervening in matters that did not concern them directly.  ey 
should be satis ed with what they currently had.66 For Korošec, however, who 
traditionally steered his policy by tipping the balance between Belgrade and 
Zagreb, this dualist exclusion of the Slovenes was the worst nightmare. It was 
clear which part of the expected dualist structure – should the latter be created 
– would ultimately incorporate the Dravska banovina. Geographical reasons, 
at least, were in favour of the solution envisaging the formation of some kind 
of Greater Croatia, incorporating the Slovene ethnic territories as well.
Some sources state that Korošec was well informed about the talks 
between Cvetković and Maček on the preparation of an agreement.67 
Nevertheless, he found out about the  nal outcome of the negotiations only 
after the agreement had been reached and signed on 26 August 1939.  e 
banovina of Croatia was established, encompassing Croatian ethnic territories 
64 MATKOVIĆ, Povijest Jugoslavije, 209–214.
65 DJOKIĆ, Elusive Compromise, 114–117. 
66 BOBAN, Sporazum, 261–263.
67 Joško KROŠELJ, “Dr. Korošec, sporazum s Hrvati in Slovenci”, Zbornik Svobodne Slovenije 21/1969, 
103–113, here 105; Ruda JURČEC, Skozi luči in sence, vol. 1–3, Buenos Aires: Editorial Baraga, 1964, 1969, 
here vol. 3, 246–248.
that had been previously distributed among various administration units. 
Croatia had its own sabor once again. Ivan Šubašić was appointed ban and 
responsible to the King.68  e arrangement was somehow reminiscent of the 
dualist compromise reached between Korošec and Pašić in Geneva in 1918, but 
rejected then by the Serbian political elite.69 With one important exception: 
the future status of the Slovenes, living now mostly in Dravska banovina, was 
not de ned. 
While Korošec was aware of the talks that Cvetković and Maček held 
with regard to the drawing up of the agreement, the course of developments 
that unfolded indicated that he was not familiar with the  nal contents of the 
agreement. It is di  cult to ascertain the extent to which this was a result of 
his decision to refrain from further complicating the negotiations by voicing 
the Slovene demands. In one of his writings, Krošelj speci cally mentioned 
Korošec’s disappointment and feeling betrayed when he  rst heard the  nal 
wording of the agreement. Albeit visibly upset, he did not stand in the way of 
compromise. Even though Korošec was disappointed to learn that the  nal 
negotiations were conducted without consulting him, he did not prevent 
the agreement.70 In his practical politics the preservation of Yugoslavia as a 
guarantor of autonomous development of the Slovene nation was the main 
constancy. Korošec was well aware that Yugoslavia could not be preserved 
without the Croats. How could it ever be? He had created it with them.
On 10 September 1939, the agreement was discussed by the Dravska 
banovina board of the Yugoslav Radical Union presided by Korošec and 
then soon after, two special commissions were founded in Ljubljana: one for 
political and legal issues and one for  nancial questions.  ese bodies were 
to submit their proposals to the commission on the state level. Opinions in 
favour of establishing a banovina of Slovenia were brought forth not only by 
Slovene members of the Yugoslav Radical Union but also Slovene adherents 
of the oppositional Yugoslav National Party.71 A very detailed justi cation 
of the demands to create the banovina of Slovenia was provided by Andrej 
Gosar in an article of September 1939 and later in a special booklet which was 
published in 1940.72
In his conversation with the royal regent Ivo Perić on 1 November 1939, 
Maček purportedly proposed maintaining the Croato-Serbian state dualism 
by simply incorporating Slovenia into the banovina of Croatia and bringing 
the thus expanded Croatia into a sort of personal union with the rest of 
the state.73 Maček, as well as some other in uential members of the party’s 
68 MATKOVIĆ, Povijest Jugoslavije, 202–209.
69 Igor GRDINA, Moč umetnosti in sila politike, Ljubljana: ICK, 2007, 148. 
70 Joško KROŠELJ, “Dr. Korošec in Hrvati”, Zbornik Svobodne Slovenije 13/1961, 87–103, here 100.
71 Ljubo BOBAN, Maček i politika Hrvatske seljačke stranke. Iz povijesti hrvatskog pitanja, vol. 1–2: 
Zagreb: Globus, 1974, here vol. 2, 321.
72 Andrej GOSAR, Banovina Slovenija, Ljubljana: Dejanje, 1940.
73 Mihajlo KONSTANTINOVIĆ, Politika sporazuma. Dnevničke beleške 1939–1941. Londonske beleške 
1944–1945, Novi Sad: Agencija Mir, 1998, 65.
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leadership, advocated the establishment of a dualist Yugoslavia. Among them, 
special mention ought to be made of Juraj Krnjević and August Košutić, who 
both left the country during dictatorship and worked in emigration.  ey 
suggested to Maček that he could agree to creating a dualist state modelled 
on Austria-Hungary, but that he should refrain from invoking this analogy in 
order not to exasperate the circles in Belgrade.74 
In the autumn of his life, Korošec thus saw history repeat itself as farce. 
When still in the Vienna Parliament, he relentlessly criticized the dualism of 
Austria-Hungary and was embittered by the politics of Hungarian government 
circles towards Croatia. And now he was suddenly faced with the possibility 
of reorganizing Yugoslavia into some kind of “Serbo-Croatian monarchy”, 
with the only di erence that, this time, the Croatian politicians obviously 
forgot about his merits from the Habsburg era. Having once defended a trialist 
reform of Austria-Hungary, he was now calling for the formation of three state 
entities within, of course, much narrower geographical coordinates. Another 
substantial di erence between Greater Austrian trialism and that of Yugoslavia 
was in that the former was based on the uni cation of the Slovenes and the 
Croats, and the latter on their disunion.
Epilogue
 e establishment of a banovina of Slovenia remained an unful lled 
wish and yet another Slovene disappointment in the history of the Yugoslav 
Kingdom. Even though Korošec still regarded Yugoslavia as the best guarantor 
of the Slovene national development, he too had obviously renounced his 
former belief that it would be possible to preserve it.  e testimonies of his 
colleagues contradict themselves on the issue. He said to Father Kazimir 
Zakrajšek in 1939, “that we would have to return under Austria”. Because the 
Transdanubian federation was apparently advocated by Great Britain, Korošec 
talked of the “British plan”.75 However, the very same year he would also 
maintain in a discussion with the representatives of the Carinthian Slovenes 
that should Yugoslavia be dissolved, the Slovenes had better “wait for a new 
Yugoslavia” under the Italian rule.76 Furthermore, given Korošec’s mysterious 
visit to Bratislava, during which the President of the newly created Slovakian 
state, Jozef Tiso, honoured him with a festive dinner on 27 May 1940 and 
discussed with him the possibility of independent Slovenia becoming part of 
Hitler’s New Order,77 Korošec seemed to have all doors open to him at the 
outbreak of the Second World War. Nevertheless, prioritizing the stability of 
74 DJOKIĆ, Elusive Compromise, 95–96.
75 Bojan GODEŠA, “Pobuda patra Kazimirja Zakrajška za ustanovitev samostojne slovenske države poleti 
1941”, Prispevki za novejšo zgodovino 2/1999, 103–121.
76 JURČEC, Skozi luči in sence, vol. 3, 293.
77 Bojan GODEŠA, “Odnos SLS do vprašanja rešitve državnopravnega položaja Slovenije po napadu sil osi 
na Jugoslavijo”, Prispevki za novejšo zgodovino 2/2001, 77–104, here 89–91.
the state over all else, Korošec continued to live up to his reputation as the 
founding father of Yugoslavia.
Despite relatively tense relations with most Croatian politicians in 
the entire interwar period, Korošec knew that certain concessions had to be 
made to the Croats in terms of the state administration reform. Yet, he made 
his support conditional on the simultaneous ful lment of Slovene political 
demands.  e settlement of the “Croatian Question” following the Cvetković-
Maček recipe certainly did not help to ease the tensions between Zagreb and 
Ljubljana; quite on the contrary. In early March 1940, Korošec tried to explain 
to the U. S. Minister in Yugoslavia Arthur Bliss Lane that Slovenia would soon 
obtain a status on a par with that of the banovina of Croatia. 78  
However, this view turned out to be too optimistic. Further administrative 
reorganization of the state was rendered impossible by a combination of war 
developments, turbulent foreign politics, and nationalist frictions on the 
domestic front. On 14 December 1940 Korošec died.  e death of the Slovene 
founding father of Yugoslavia left the political leadership in Ljubljana without 
the key authority. Not the Slovene People’s Party only, the entire Yugoslavia 
was left without the most experienced leader precisely at the time when Europe 
became almost completely swallowed in the darkness of the  ird Reich. 
78 BOBAN, Maček, vol. 2, 264.
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Sažetak
ANTON KOROŠEC I “HRVATSKO PITANJE” U JUGOSLAVIJI
Andrej RAHTEN
100. godišnjica postanka Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca 
dobra je prilika za evaluaciju biogra ja njezinih utemeljitelja. Među 
slovenskim političarima, nedvojbeno treba istaknuti ulogu Antona Korošca, 
dugogodišnjeg čelnika Slovenske pučke stranke. Posebno je zanimljivo 
njegovo viđenje državnopravnih pitanja u Jugoslaviji, prije svega njegov odnos 
prema „hrvatskom pitanju“. Prelazak Slovenaca i Hrvata iz austro-ugarskog 
u jugoslavenski državni okvir doveo je i do raspada većine tradicionalnih 
koalicija slovenskih i hrvatskih stranaka. Korošec je sudbinu Slovenske pučke 
stranke pragmatički vezao uz srpske stranke. Vjerojatno je zaključio da će pod 
srpskom dinastijom, bez obzira na sastav vlade, jedna od tih stranaka uvijek 
biti na vlasti. Uoči postanka jugoslavenske kraljevine, unitarističku formulu o 
jednom „trojednom narodu“ tako su isticali i slovenski katolički narodnjaci. 
Na taj način srušio se i politički koncept solidarnosti s hrvatskim pravašima i 
seljačkim pokretom Stjepana Radića, koji je Slovenska pučka stranka izgradila 
prije Prvoga svjetskog rata. A bez savezništva s Radićevom Hrvatskom 
republikanskom seljačkom strankom Korošec u svojoj politici doista nije 
mogao računati na podršku hrvatskog stanovništva. Korošec je, međutim, 
bio znatno uspješniji u povezivanju s Hrvatskom pučkom strankom. Na tu 
stranku oslonio se Korošec, nastojeći ostvariti ambicije da u novom državnom 
okviru svoj utjecaj proširi i izvan slovenskih granica. Hrvatska pučka stranka 
ostala je u Kraljevini SHS najlojalniji Koroščev saveznik u državnoj politici, 
osnivajući zajedno sa zastupnicima slovenske sestrinske stranke i Jugoslavenski 
klub u Narodnoj skupštini. Korošec nije bio isključivi krivac za zahlađenje 
odnosa između Slovenske pučke stranke i Radićeva pokreta. Činjenica je da 
je Radić svojim protuklerikalnim izjavama i pozivima na osnivanje republike 
i sam otežao uvjete za suradnju s Korošcem, koji je bio svećenik i monarhist. 
Uz to, Koroščev manevarski prostor za suradnju s Radićem bio je vrlo sužen. 
Naime, kao protivnik političkog katolicizma, Radić je bio i protivnik Hrvatske 
pučke stranke, pa je logično da se Korošec teško povezivao s njezinom 
neposrednom suparnicom na izborima. Mostove s najjačom hrvatskom 
strankom Korošec je srušio u ljeto 1928., kada je, nakon atentata na Stjepana 
Radića, pristao da bude predsjednik vlade. Iako je u vladu privukao i čelnika 
Hrvatske pučke stranke Stjepana Barića, Korošec je iz hrvatske javnosti bio 
zasut optužbama da na račun Hrvatske spletkari sa Srbima. Kao što je rekao 
Radićev nasljednik Vladko Maček, vođa Slovenske pučke stranke postavio 
se u borbi između Zapada i Istoka ondje „gdje se nije smio postaviti ni kao 
čovjek zapadnoeuropske civilizacije, niti kao Slovenac, ponajmanje pak kao 
katolički svećenik“. Korošec se sve do smrti nije uspio osloboditi predbacivanja 
za svojevrsnu izdaju, koja su  u hrvatskoj povijesnoj svijesti i dandanas živa. 
Međutim, treba istaknuti da je nakon povratka iz internacije na Hvaru 
Korošec više puta pokazao da je svjestan težine „hrvatskog pitanja“. Dok je 
bio ministar unutrašnjih poslova u vladi Milana Stojadinovića, on se otvoreno 
sukobio s premijerom zbog provedbe izbora u Hrvatskoj. Pad Stojadinovićeve 
vlade bio je, prije svega, rezultat Koroščeve politike. Naime, slovenski se 
državnik, za razliku od Stojadinovića, zalagao za sporazum prema kojem bi 
došlo do ispunjenja barem dijela hrvatskih zahtjeva, pa je čak u početku bio 
ovlašten od kneza Pavla da radi na tom pitanju. Ali u  nalu pregovora oko 
sporazuma Cvetković-Maček, Korošec više nije bio konzultiran, pa se tako 
osjećao prevarenim. Usprkos tome, Korošec je u ime državne konsolidacije 
podupro sporazum, ali je zahtijevao da se uz Banovinu Hrvatsku utemelji i 
slična slovenska tvorevina.    
                  
